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Theme: 
Scientific Ethics
Thomas Edison is often credited with creating the 
first research laboratory.a Legend has it that when a new 
hire asked about the rules of the lab, Edison responded 
with a wisecrack: “We don’t have rules. We’re trying to 
accomplish something.” 
What do we try to accomplish in research? Research 
has an exciting objective, for in it we are trying to ask and 
answer the most difficult questions known. Notice how 
different this goal is from the goal of training young research-
ers in the responsible conduct of research (RCR). Here the 
aim is indeed to train people to obey rules, almost as if we 
were training a pet. It’s “no secret,” as Melissa Anderson 
has noted, “that researchers tend to view instruction in the 
responsible conduct of research as an annoyance” (1). What 
is the role of philosophers in this area? Our role is to raise 
questions about the general approach. Is it working? Are 
the rules clear and consistent? Is ethics a source of rules 
and final answers—or of questions and further research?
WHAT IS ETHICS?
Ethics is a research area, a sub-field of philosophy in 
which we ask questions and look for answers about right 
and wrong, and good and bad. The study of ethics focuses 
on harms and benefits, virtues and vices, choices and dis-
positions, conflicts and agreements, and the justifications 
of decisions. The three central branches are: 
• Descriptive ethics, the empirical study of what 
people actually do, believe, and value;
• Normative ethics, the evaluative study of how we 
should behave in particular cases; and
• Metaethics, the philosophical study of the founda-
tions of moral language.
Descriptive ethics involves psychological, sociological, 
and anthropological inquiry into ethical values as evidenced 
by, on the one hand, what people say they ought to do, and, 
on the other hand, by what they actually do. Metaethicists 
study questions such as: Where does morality come from? 
How do we ultimately justify ethical judgments? RCR falls 
primarily into the area of normative ethics, which analyzes 
the development of practical standards, and applies them 
to the following kinds of questions: What topic ought I to 
choose for my dissertation research? What should I do if I 
witness someone cheating? What policies and regulations 
concerning research would be the best for my institution 
to adopt? 
Theories of normative ethics help us to figure out how 
to behave, giving guidance and recommendations when we 
face conflicting interests. They do this by giving us the means 
to make moral judgments, which are prescriptive rather 
than descriptive. That is, moral judgments tell us not how 
we in fact act, but how we ought to act. This is important, 
since we are not always inclined to do what is right. The 
point here is that a good ethical theory yields answers that 
are normative, action-guiding answers.
Normative ethics does not just provide one stan-
dard according to which one can determine what one 
ought to do or whether a certain situation is morally 
good or bad. It posits a number of ethical theories, each 
with its own standard or standards, and these theories 
sometimes yield different answers to practical problems. 
Just as scientific claims are grounded in scientific theo-
ries, moral judgments are grounded in ethical theories. 
Therefore, when considering normative questions, we 
need to know which theory is in play. A good theory has 
four characteristics.
1. It is serious.
Ethical issues bother us. Think of the emotional invest-
ment you have in your response to legislation that deals 
with preventative war strikes, discrimination on the basis 
of race or religion, abortions, gay marriages, sport hunting, 
or human embryonic stem cell research. When we raise 
such issues we believe that they deserve to be taken seri-
ously. And we want to be taken seriously when we engage 
in reasoned argument about them. 
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2. It is fair.
Ethical theories should give rise to similar judgments 
about similar cases. That is, they are characterized by fair-
ness. If a theory lets me decide that it is morally wrong for 
Carrie to drop an outlying data point in a particular paper, 
but it doesn’t have me apply the same judgment to Kwame 
in similar circumstances, then something is wrong with the 
theory. Similar circumstances call for similar judgments. If 
I do not use language in this way, then I am probably not 
making a moral judgment. If I say dropping data points is ok 
when my friends do it but not ok when anyone else does 
it, I am making a claim of preference or taste, not morality. 
To call an action “unethical” or “morally wrong” simply is 
to say that the action is wrong for all persons facing similar 
circumstances. 
3. It is overriding.
As suggested in the previous paragraph, moral judg-
ments are sometimes confused with judgments of taste or 
etiquette. If I say that I prefer bananas to mandarin oranges 
on my breakfast cereal and that you are wrong to prefer 
oranges, I don’t mean “wrong” in a moral sense. I am not 
making a moral claim because my claim is not meant to be 
universal or overriding. It applies only to me. On the other 
hand, if I say that consuming bananas in the United States 
is wrong because it supports an ecologically unfriendly and 
monopolistic form of international agribusiness, I am making 
an ethical claim. The point here is that whatever theory or 
source one regards as most fundamental in such matters is 
one’s ethical basis, because it takes precedence over other 
sources of authority, even religious sources.
4. It is systematic.
A good moral theory tells us, in a detailed and compre-
hensive way, which things are good and bad. What might a 
theory consider good? Typical candidates include justice, 
the virtues, pleasure, happiness, human flourishing, a good 
will, the satisfaction of desires, human rights, obedience to 
divine commands, and keeping one’s word. Likewise, each 
theory has a corresponding view about ultimate badness. 
In sum, any ethical theory worth its salt will be seri-
ous, fair, overriding, and systematic. Three theories have 
attracted the most attention from English-speaking moral 
philosophers: two forms of deontology—contractualism 
and rights-based deontology—and utilitarianism, or conse-
quentialist-based ethics. A fourth theory, egoism, describes 
a minimal moral commitment that everyone surely has and 
provides a good starting point pedagogically.
FOUR ETHICAL THEORIES
Egoism holds that a person ought to do what is in 
his or her own long-term best interests. Egoism provides 
a ready answer to the question, “Why should I be moral?” 
For among the many interests that you have, having a suc-
cessful research career is one of them, and being caught in 
violation of professional standards will derail your career. 
Egoism provides a useful perspective from which to engage 
students in questions about research misconduct because 
misconduct often has consequences that are contrary to 
a researcher’s interests. A major philosophical problem 
with egoism, however, is that it fails our first two criteria 
of good ethical theories. It seems to be neither serious 
nor fair because it seems to make light of difficult ethical 
questions and it is arbitrarily prejudiced toward one group’s 
interests (mine).
Contractualism, a deontological theory, provides a 
strong answer to a second question, “What is goodness?” 
Contractualism’s answer is: reasonableness. The good is 
found in our nature as rational animals who do things like 
make promises, and who can be counted on to perform 
the actions we have pledged to do for each other. Loving 
parents, friends, instructors, and other mentors teach us 
to speak and act with courage and honesty—and to give 
reasons for our actions when we have not acted appropri-
ately. Contractualists urge morally good people to justify to 
others what they do. Such justification is usually as simple as 
pointing out that one’s action coheres with the terms of a 
compact one has entered. Because the research careers to 
which graduate students aspire are governed by norms and 
principles, contractualism is an apt theory from which to ex-
plore issues related to professional codes, authorship, peer 
review, and the collecting, managing, and communicating of 
data. A reservation about contractualism is that it seems 
to make it impossible to criticize the rules and reasons of 
the group to which one belongs.
Rights theories are forms of deontology, like contrac-
tualism. They provide a powerful answer to a third question, 
“What counts as a right action?” The answer is that right 
actions respect the dignity of individuals. Rights theorists 
hold that people are autonomous, that they have the ability 
to make their own choices, and that others must respect 
this capacity. Even if someone is using their freedom to 
make sub-optimal decisions, their decision-making ability 
must not be overridden. Rights theories advise us not to 
harm individuals even if our aim is to secure much greater 
benefits for many others. Because research often involves 
human subjects, rights theories can be used to structure 
thinking about the use of humans in research, mentoring, 
intellectual property, and conflicts of interests. The major 
weakness of the theory is that it seems to have a difficult 
time justifying the grounds of human rights.
Utilitarianism provides a different answer than con-
tract theory to the question, “What is goodness?” Here, 
the good is pleasure or happiness or the satisfaction of 
interests. Utilitarianism holds that a person ought to do 
what will maximize or optimize the good, which amounts 
to the overall best consequences for everyone concerned, 
and it counsels us to consider equally the like interests of all 
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individuals affected by our actions. Since research sometimes 
involves nonhuman subjects, utilitarianism is appropriate for 
thinking about the use of animals in research, our duties 
to the environment and future generations, and the wider 
social responsibilities of researchers. Utilitarianism’s major 
weakness is that it seems to undervalue the weight of our 
special attachments to those nearest and dearest to us.
Why look at four separate theories? Can all four not 
be blended into one overarching theory? Most philosophers 
think that the answer is no because each theory gives dif-
ferent answers to critical questions, the questions of what 
things are good and bad and which actions are right and 
wrong. Each theory, then, is a rival of the others because 
each has different theoretical commitments and normative 
implications. Indeed, each theory has a school populated 
with moral philosophers who defend it, a school that also 
seeks to expose the weaknesses of the competitors. This 
is not a situation we should lament because disagreements 
concerning foundational matters exist in every discipline. 
Healthy research fields are marked by vigorous theoreti-
cal arguments. That said, a promising proposal by the late 
twentieth century Oxford philosopher R. M. Hare suggests 
a way to tap into the strengths of all four theories.
Hare, a utilitarian, recognized the significance of egoism 
and interpreted utilitarianism in a way favorable to contrac-
tualism and rights theories (3). Influenced by Hare, Princeton 
ethicist Peter Singer, Hare’s student, in a book called The 
Expanding Circle, draws on evolutionary theory to develop 
a hybrid picture (4). In this work, morality begins with self-
interest, extends to one’s immediate family and friends, 
and works outward from there as if in a widening circle of 
moral consideration in the direction of all human beings 
and sentient animals. The Hare-Singer picture describes a 
heuristic that brings order to the scattered RCR topics as 
well as a method for moral decision making.
RCR TOPICS ORGANIZED AS AN EXPANDING MORAL CIRCLE
Here follows a method of ethical decision making based 
on the four moral theories. The method, the expanding 
circle, begins with a consideration of what is in my best 
interests, my own egoistic concerns. Each of us has many 
interests, and identifying which of your interests is most 
important to you is not an easy task. It requires rigorous 
and ongoing self-examination. You’ll need to ask, “Who 
am I? What do I most want to do with my life?” Honest 
introspection will reveal that the satisfaction of your pro-
fessional interests is impossible without the satisfaction of 
the interests of others. To satisfy your desire to obtain an 
advanced degree and begin your career requires that oth-
ers satisfy their desires and do their jobs competently, too.
So ethics might start with egoistic concerns (and note 
that this is a controversial suggestion in itself), but anyone 
who is a member of a group—and this is all of us—will see 
that being loyal to oneself entails being loyal to the groups 
whose memberships give one’s life meaning. After all, some 
of our interests are inevitably tied up with others’ interests. 
As children, we want to satisfy our own desires, but we also 
naturally care about our parents and learn to show respect 
for our siblings. 
Nor does the circle end there. Our interests entail oth-
ers’ interests in part because we seek affiliation with others. 
Hardwired for empathy toward those nearest and dearest, 
we naturally feel empathy with those like us. Furthermore, 
we can learn to care about humans who are not so intimately 
related to us, and even to care about strangers. With proper 
upbringing, we come to understand that the physical and 
psychological pains of others hurt them just as much as ours 
hurt us, that others value their lives as much as we value 
ours. Believing that all humans are entitled to equal rights is 
the foundation for laws protecting humans used in research. 
The same argument can be given for taking account of the 
needs of the homeless and hungry, wherever they are. The 
expansion of the circle continues outward toward future 
human generations. See Figure 1.
But it does not end with our species. For we also protect 
animals—at least those used in research—to some extent, 
with welfare laws that require that we replace sentient crea-
tures with mathematical models or in vitro models whenever 
possible. Nor does the circle necessarily end there; some 
argue that it includes natural ecosystems, recognizing the 
intrinsic values of the earth and its systems. Arguably, then, 
even nature itself—its endangered species and habitats—
deserves consideration. Where should we draw the line? 
The answer is up for grabs and a question on which moral 
philosophers conduct research. The only point we need to 
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FIGURE 1. The expanding moral circle.
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insist upon here is that researchers may begin with their 
own egoistic concerns but they cannot reasonably end there. 
The logic of our commitments as professionals requires that 
we take seriously the interests of others.
The expanding circle lends coherence to the usual hodge-
podge of canonical RCR topics. As it is in a person’s own 
interest to report falsification, understand fabrication, avoid 
plagiarism, beware of intuition, and justify one’s decisions, it 
is useful to begin RCR discussions with the principle that we 
ought to do what is in our own long-term best interests. As 
it is in the interest of a person’s research group to articulate 
their reasons for their conclusions, to write cooperatively, 
review manuscripts professionally, and report statistics 
transparently, one can introduce the principle that we ought 
to keep our promises and contracts. As it is a basic matter 
of rights to respect human subjects, mentor inclusively, 
recognize intellectual property, and reveal both conflicts of 
interests and collaborations with private industry, an RCR 
instructor can introduce the idea that we ought to respect 
each individual’s moral rights. Finally, as many animals can 
feel pain, are subjects of their own lives, and have interests 
of their own, we must take seriously our role in their welfare 
as research subjects. In this last step, we expand the circle 
fully, considering animal experimentation, duties to future 
generations and the natural environment, and the larger 
social responsibilities of researchers while adopting a utilitar-
ian principle: We ought to do what will maximize aggregate 
happiness. Figure 2 summarizes the approach.
CONCLUSION
The role of philosophers in RCR training is to raise 
questions and seek answers about right and wrong, good 
and bad. Philosophers can suggest heuristics by which 
individuals can make decisions, too. One such method 
is built on four ethical theories: egoism, contractualism, 
moral rights, and utilitarianism. The method raises ques-
tions about four kinds of interests that correspond to the 
theories. The standard RCR topics arise in the course 
of exploring these interests and emerge together as an 
expanding circle.
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Part A. Protect my interests 
1. Report misconduct 
2. Avoid plagiarism
3. Beware intuition
4. Justify decisions
Part B. Promote our interests
5. Articulate reasons
6. Write cooperatively
7. Protect manuscripts
8. Clarify statistics
Part C. Respect strangers’ rights 
9. Inform subjects
10. Mentor inclusively
11. Recognize property
12. Reveal conflicts
Part D. Honor all interests
13.  Treat humanely
14.  Preserve environments
15.  Cultivate responsibility 
FIGURE 2. RCR topics organized according to the expanding moral 
circle metaphor.
